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Abstract of thesis entitled: Announcement Effect of MBO in China 
This paper investigates the announcement effect of management buyouts (MBO) in 
China and analyzes whether such effect is related with announcement year, underlying 
assets, ESOP participation, competitive purchaser, and the results of success or not. 
Explanation for the announcement effect is illustrated with regard to earning capacity 
and pricing. Our sample includes 114 MBO announcements of 85 companies from 
1997 to 2007, covering all the MBO of China listing companies with public 
announcement concerning the transaction. We present four major findings. First, the 
announcement effect is negative towards apparent MBOs, except when the purchaser 
is founder of the company. The negative effect reflects investors' pessimistic attitude 
towards MBO. Second, some factors may lead to more negative announcement effect: 
announcement year after 2003, acquisition of parent company, no ESOP participation, 
etc. Third, the profitability of companies does deteriorate after completion of MBO, 
which verifies investors' misgivings about worsen earning capacities after MBO. 
Fourth, the net asset value, a key measure of share pricing in MBO, is manipulated 
down before MBO. The low transfer price may be another reason for the negative 
announcement effect. 
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1. Introduction 
The management buyout (MBO) is a type of tender offer that the managers and/or 
executives of a company purchase controlling interest in a company from existing 
shareholders. The purpose of such a buyout from the managers' point of view may be 
to save their jobs, either if the business has been scheduled for closure or if they 
would be substituted by another management team; they may also want to maximize 
the financial benefits from the success they bring to the company; in addition, it is a 
strategy to ward off aggressive buyers. 
There was a boom of MBO in the US in the 1980s during which over a hundred of 
MBO offers were reported. The management purchases the shares in the secondary 
market and acquires the controlling right of company. The MBO proposals in the US 
could generate positive abnormal stock returns and bring wealth gains to the 
shareholders (DeAnglo, DeAnglo and Rice (1984)). After MBO the operating 
performance of those companies has remarkable improvement (Kaplan (1989))，in 
comparison with no improvement of unsuccessful MBOs (Eli Ofek (1994)). 
MBO in China started since late 1990s. The first public announced MBO case of 
Chinese listed firms was Shanghai Dazhong Public Utilities (600635.SH) in 1997 
which reported legal shares transfer to a company controlled by the employees' 
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shareholding society. Since then many companies in China started proceedings of 
MBO. 
Due to the difference of share structure and regulation system, the MBO in China is 
quite different from those in the US: 
> Acquired shares: non-tradable shares v.s. transferable shares. 
In the US, all the shares of a company are transferable in secondary market. For MBO 
the management acquires the shares in the secondary market as an open action. But in 
China, shares were split into tradable shares and non-tradable shares (NTS) before the 
NTS reform. The non-tradable shares, including state shares and legal shares, could 
not be traded in secondary market. Most MBO of listed state owned enterprises (SOE) 
are realized through the transfer of non-tradable shares without public transaction in 
secondary market. 
> Share pricing: net asset value v.s. stock price in secondary market 
As the MBO in the US is publicly operated in secondary market, the acquisition price 
should be comparable to the stock price and usually with a premium. But in China 
there are no specific rules for non-tradable shares pricing. In Mar 1997 China 
government prescribed that the transfer price of state shares must not be lower than 
net asset value. Thereafter a majority of such transaction pricings refer to the net asset 
value which is much lower than the secondary market price. 
> Financing of MBO: self-owned money v.s. bond, loan and private equity 
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In the US market, the MBO is a kind of leverage buyout (LBO). The management 
team can get money from bond issuance, cooperation with private equities as well as 
loans from financial institutions like investment banks. But in China there is neither 
mature bond market nor active equity investment institutions. Moreover, China 
government strictly forbids management teams using state assets as collateral to 
secure bank loans. Therefore there is not efficient source for MBO financing in China 
and the management could only use self-owned money. As a matter of fact most 
MBO announcements in China do not reveal any source of the money for the 
acquisitions. 
> Competition: Little v.s. Much 
Like other types of mergers and acquisitions, the management in the US publicly 
proposed MBO with share acquisition in the secondary market. In many cases the 
management faces competition of offer bids from other individuals. But in China the 
MBO is usually conducted through negotiation between the management and 
representatives of the government or other institutions. The lack of competition may 
result in unfair deals, especially in pricing. 
The huge differences as stated above motivate us to investigate MBO in China. This 
paper studies the initial announcement effect and explains the underlying reasons with 
regard to profitability and price manipulation. 
First we collect the information of MBO announcements of China listing companies. 
Currently there is no consensus on the MBO sample in China. We make a screening 
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of China listing companies that were reported to conduct MBO and check the 
announcements to identify every detail of the MBO cases. At last we construct a 
database including 114 MBO announcements of 85 China listing companies. 
Then we study the announcement effect of MBO. The method used to estimate the 
effect of MBO announcement is the conventional event-time methodology which is 
also used in DeAnglo, DeAnglo and Rice (1984) and Hite and Vetsuypens (1989). To 
exclude the noise effect of other events and intensify the real effect of MBO, we 
divide the initial announcements of 85 companies into 6 groups according to the 
disclosure transparency, timing, and special characters. Both student t test and 
Wilcoxon test are conducted on the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) in each group 
to examine whether there is any significant announcement effect. 
Next we examine whether the announcement effect of MBO has any relevance with 
some variables, including year, underlying asset, ESOP participation, competitive 
purchaser and the results. Since the variables are all dummy variables, the statistic 
tests not only examine the significance of CAR in each state of variables but also the 
difference of CAR when the variable changes. Correlation between every two 
variables is calculated to demonstrate the independence. 
Finally we try to explain the announcement effect with regard to profitability and 
pricing. We investigate profitability change around MBO event year with DuPont 
analysis to disclose the change of earning capacity and leverage ratio. Dividend policy 
and shareholder's return are examined to illustrate the operating retention and equity 
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holder's benefits in post-MBO period. We also test whether the transfer share price 
(measured by NAV) is manipulated down before MBO. 
The main contribution of our research lies in that: 
> Construction of database including all the MBO announcements of China listing 
companies until 2007. To our knowledge this is the most complete collection of 
MBO announcement information in China up to now. 
> Group division of announcement events according to the disclosure transparency, 
timing, and special characters. This step is unnecessary for the research of MBO 
in the US since all the proposals are disclosed timely and transparently. But in 
China, many announcements of MBO are obscure and mixed with other events. 
The group division minimizes the noise effect of other events and intensifies the 
real announcement effect of MBO. This is the key reason that I get the significant 
results for China MBO effect but others do not (Yi (2003), Feng and Dai (2005)). 
> We propose explanation of announcement effect with regard to profitability and 
pricing. In the US the wealth effect is usually regarded as gain-sharing between 
the management and the stockholders (DeAnglo, DeAnglo and Rice (1984)). But 
the MBO in China do not involve secondary market transaction and the report 
effect mainly reflects investors' subjective attitude. If overall investors perceive 
right, the announcement effect should be in line with potential profitability 
change and abnormal transaction price. 
> We employ the industry adjusted financial measures to review a firm's 
performance ranking in the industry and the annual difference of industry 
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adjusted measures to inspect the individual change. The model is applied to most 
financial measures examined in our paper, including ROE, net margin, asset 
turnover, equity multiplier, dividend payout ratio, dividend yield, stockholding 
returns, etc. 
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we will review the wealth effect, 
operation improvement and disputes about MBO in the US as well as the relevant 
research and regulations in China. In section 3，data selection and sources will be 
introduced. In section 4，we will test the announcement effect in MBO groups divided 
by announcement transparency, timing and special characters. Furthermore we will 
examine whether the announcement effect has any relevance with certain variables. In 
section 5 we will explain the announcement effect with regard to the profitability and 
pricing justness. And in section 6，we will make conclusion. 
2. Review of literatures and regulations 
2.1. MBO in the US 
Management buyout is the purchase of a publicly traded corporation by a group of 
investors including the firm's management. In the US it is a tender offer in the 
secondary market similar as other acquisitions. 
Many researchers studied whether the public stockholders could benefit from MBO 
and found remarkable increase in the shareholders' wealth on the announcement of 
the MBO proposals. For example, DeAnglo, DeAnglo and Rice (1984) studied 72 
MBO proposals during the period of 1973-1980 and reported an average of 22.27% 
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abnormal stock return in a 2-day window around announcement date in their sample. 
They also reported an average premium of 56% offered by the management in cash, 
which was on average higher than the premium reported for the inter-firm cash tender 
offer of 49-56% by Bradley (1980) and Jarrell and Bradley (1980). Torabzadeh and 
Berlin (1987) and Travlos and Comett (1993) also provided evidence for the wealth 
effect on MBO. These results strongly supported the gain-sharing hypothesis between 
the management and shareholders. 
Since the completion of MBO could lead to improved incentives and mitigative 
principle-agent problems, researchers are interested in the change of operating 
performance after MBO. Kaplan (1989)，by examining the post-buyout operating 
changes in 48 large deals of successful MBO between 1980 and 1986, reported 
remarkable improvement in operating income, cash flow and market return after 
MBO. In comparison, Eli Ofek (1994) used a sample of 120 unsuccessful MBOs and 
found no evidence of performance improvement of these firms. Smith (1990) also 
found no improvement in operating performance in a sample of 24 unsuccessful 
MBOs in the year following the buyout attempts. 
Although MBO could bring wealth gains to shareholders and potential improvement 
in operating performance, it is questioned for the validity since management as 
purchaser of the shares has incentive to minimize compensation paid. The impending 
possibility of an MBO may lead to principal-agent problems, moral hazard, 
asymmetric information and even the downward manipulation of the stock price via 
adverse information disclosure. Longstreth (1986) pointed out a variety of techniques 
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for managers to adversely affect the open-market stock price. Perry and Williams 
(1994) employed a sample of 175 MBO cases during 1981-1988 and found that 
discretionary accruals are negative in the year preceding the MBO. Wu (1996) 
examined 87 MBO cases during 1980-1987 and found that managers manipulated 
earnings downward prior to the MBO proposal. 
As for the market performance, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) reported a 
nonmonotonic relationship between management ownership and market valuation 
(Tobin's Q). Tobin's Q first increases, then declines, and finally rises slightly as 
ownership by the board of directors rises, which reflected weakened insider 
controlling and probable exploitation at a certain amount of management 
shareholding. 
2.2. MBO in China 
Due to the special corporate ownership structure in China, MBO is a sensitive event 
closely related with SOE restructuring and state-owned assets transfer. The practice of 
MBO has aroused public outcry because many state assets have been sold off at huge 
discounts in irregular ways to powerful managers. Lang (2006), by examining typical 
MBO cases, disclosed the truth behind China MBO transactions which involved all 
kinds of intrigues including financial manipulation, auction tricks, discounted sale of 
State assets, etc. He pointed out that the intrinsic nature of MBO in China is 
fundamentally different from that in the US. 
At the same time China government constituted a series of policies to regulate share 
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transfer of state assets and MBO, which reflected the policy maker's progressive 
understanding on the issue. 
- I n Mar 1997 the predecessor of State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Committee (SASAC) prescribe that the transfer price of state 
shares must not be lower than net asset value. 
- I n Mar 2003 the Ministry of Finance (MOF) prohibited MBO of China SOEs. 
- I n Dec 2003 the SASAC issued strict regulation on the restructuring of SOEs and 
MBO, including proper financial auditing of the management team's performance, 
inviting independent intermediary agencies to participate in drafting MBO plans, 
undergoing bidding procedures on property right markets, and forbidding 
management teams from using State assets as collateral to secure bank loans and 
purchasing more State assets. 
- I n Apr 2005，the SASAC tightened the rules on MBO and stipulated only small 
and medium sized companies can operate MBO; the management can not entrust 
any third party to accept the shares. 
- I n Jan 2006 the regulations on MBO was revised; prohibition of MBO on large 
scale SOEs was removed but remain under strict restraints. 
Empirical research on wealth effect and earning performance of China MBO 
companies is relatively less than the US. Most of the research is conducted in 
2003-2005 when there are not yet sufficient MBO cases. Major findings are 
inconclusive. 
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On the wealth effect of MBO, there is no remarkable result. Yi (2003), using a sample 
of 18 MBOs from 1990 to 2002，found an average CAR of 0.49% in a (-2,2) window 
around the MBO announcement days, 2.92% in (-10,1) window and - 0.9% in (0,10) 
window. Feng and Dai (2005) collected 42 MBO announcements of 34 firms during 
1997-2003 and reported no significant abnormal returns for both short and long 
windows around the MBO announcements. 
For the operating performance, Yi (2003) used earning per share (EPS) as the measure 
and found an increase of EPS by 18.9% and 22.1% in the year before and of MBO, 
but -23.87% in the year after the MBOs, indicating no operating improvement. 
The justifiability of MBO pricing in China is examined by researchers. In many 
cases the compensations of MBO in China are measured with net asset value. Yi 
(2003) found that 50% of the firms' net assets decreased before the MBO 
announcements, and after the MBO announcements, 11.12% still decreased, 38.88% 
increased. Feng and Zhang (2005) used the present value of the free cash flow of 
equity (FCFE) to price the non-tradable share and found the discounted value 
significant higher than the acquired prices, which suggested that the management 
might manipulate the net asset value before the MBO. 
3. Data selection and sources 
There is no consensus on the MBO sample in China. It is a difficult job to 
identify the MBO cases in China. Due to the sensitivity of SOE restructuring and 
state-owned assets diversion, the MBO transactions in China are not as apparent as in 
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western countries. The management usually purchases shares of the company or its 
parent company under the cover of "shell" company or ESOP (Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans) to indirectly control the company. Some of the transactions are not 
regarded as MBO until revealed by media disclosure after the event. 
We made a screening of the Chinese listed companies that were reported to have 
conducted MBO and check the share transaction in public announcement. The final 
sample includes those MBO transactions satisfying at least one of the following 
criteria: 
1) The management purchase over 10% stake of the company or 
2) A single manager purchase over 1% stake of the company or 
3) Management acquire the control right of over 5% via the "shell" company. 
We impose the first 2 criteria to distinguish MBO from the management 
incentive mechanism and the last one to indicate that management could impose 
significant influence over the company. 
Finally we collected 114 MBO announcements of 85 Chinese listed companies 
during 1997-2007 (see Table 1). Some companies completed MBO in several steps. 
Transaction information is collected from public announcement of listing companies. 
Daily return of equity and market are obtained from CSMAR database 
implemented by Bloomberg. 
4. Announcement effect of MBO 
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4.1. Research method 
The method used to estimate the announcement effect of MBO is the event-time 
methodology which is also used in DeAnglo, DeAnglo and Rice (1984) and Hite and 
Vetsuypens (1989). We examine the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) around the 
buyout announcement day to detect the announcement effect. For each firm i, we 
calculate the prediction error for day t as: 
where 
Rjt = the rate of return on stock i for event day t and 
Rmt = the rate of market return on the CSMAR free-float weighted index for event 
day t. 
A 
The coefficient d^ and p- are the ordinary least squares estimates of the intercept 
and slope of the market model regression. The market model regression was estimated 
for each firm from t=-120 to day t=-20 relative to the buyout announcement date t=0. 
We select the window o f 卜1，1] and [ - 5 , 5 ] around announcement day as invest igat ion 
period of CAR. The former represents the immediate effect and the latter COUld reflect 
a continuing effect eliminating the influence caused by limit of daily price change in 
China stock market. 
4.2. Group division of MBO companies 
4.2.1. Division rules 
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We divided the initial announcement of MBO of 85 companies into 6 groups (sample 
size in the brackets): 
> Apparent MBO (47): the MBO could be identified from the public announcement, 
except the cases of founder buyout. 
> Veiled MBO (15): no signs of MBO in the announcement, but revealed to be 
MBO afterwards. 
> Late announcement (8): announced after the event period, usually briefly reported 
in annual reports or non-tradable-shares reform reports. 
> Subsidiary disposal (8): MBO of subsidiary. 
> Founder buyout (6): the buyouts are proposed by founder of the company. 
Usually the manager has been shareholder and real controller of company before 
the transaction. 
> Close to Non-tradable-shares Reform (1): the MBO is conducted within 1 month 
before or after NTS Reform and the announcement effect is interfered by NTS 
Reform effect. 
Student t test and Wilcoxon test on the CAR post interesting results (See Table 3). For 
the entire sample, mean and median of CAR are insignificant positive. Significant 
results come from two groups: apparent MBO and founder buyouts. 
4.2.2. Apparent MBO: significant negative 
For apparent MBO the CAR[-1,1] and CAR[-5,5] are both significant negative which 
reflect investors' pessimistic attitude towards MBO. 
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Due to the special share structure of SOE in China, the shares that management 
acquires are mostly State Shares and Legal Shares, which are not tradable in 
secondary market. Thus the MBO do not involve in secondary market action. 
Investors could not get acquisition premium as in the US, but have to bear wealth loss 
caused by the negative return. To some extent the market effect indicates investors' 
pessimistic view of future profitability. In addition the transfer prices of some MBO 
cases are rather low which are regarded as discounted sale of state-owned-assets. We 
will discuss it in detail in section 5. 
4.2.3. Founder buyouts: significant positive 
For founder buyouts the CAR[-1,1] and CAR[-5,5] are both significant positive which 
reflect investors' acceptance of founder-controller. 
Since the founders are usually pathfinder of the company and have sufficient track 
record to prove their capacities and executive power, the founders' acquisition for 
controlling shares could be regarded as a positive signal of smooth operation and 
promising earning growth. 
4.2.4. Other groups: insignificant positive but not representative for MBO effect 
For the other groups, the CAR is insignificant positive. Unlike the apparent MBOs, 
these groups may have announcement effect interfered by other information. For 
example, CAR of those with late announcement and close to NTS Reform may 
include financial report effect and event-driven effect by NTS reform (Huang, Su and 
Chong (2008)). Veiled MBO is easily confused with general acquisition or trusts 
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which hide the real identity of management from the public and thus the CAR could 
not represent the real announcement effect of MBO. For the MBO of subsidiaries we 
would rather call it subsidiary disposal due to little influence to the operation of listing 
company. Therefore the group of apparent MBO is the most representative sample for 
announcement effect from which investors could properly conceive the nature of 
transaction. 
4.3. Factor analysis 
To study the influence of different variables on announcement effect of MBO, we 
analyze the sample of apparent MBO with the following factors: announcement year, 
underlying asset, ESOP participation, competitive purchaser, and MBO results. Since 
they are all dummy variables in our sample, we not only conduct statistic tests to 
examine the significance of CAR for every variable state but also test the difference 
of CAR when the variable changes. (See Table 4) 
4.3.1. Year: before 2003/ after 2003 (include 2003). 
In March 2003 the MoF prohibited MBO and nine months later SASAC issued 
Regulations on Restructuring of SOEs which first specified the regulations on 
management buyout. We consider it the watershed of government and public attitude 
towards MBO. 
In our sample, 18 companies announced MBO before 2003 and 29 after 2003 (include 
2003). Student t test and Wilcoxon test show that apparent MBO after 2003 release 
significant negative CAR in both [-1,1] and [-5,5] window while those before 2003 
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have insignificant negative CAR. In particular CAR[-1,1] of MBO after 2003 is 
significantly more negative than those before 2003. 
The government's ban on MBO was a sudden strike that officially clarified the 
disapproval attitude. The announcement effect remarkably reflects the common 
awareness of the harm caused by MBO since 2003. 
4.3.2. Underlying asset: parent company / the listing company itself. 
To control a company, the management could either purchase shares of listing 
company or acquire shares of its parent company. It will be examined whether the 
direct shareholding and indirect controlling may result in different announcement 
effect. 
Among apparent MBOs, 31 are realized through parent company acquisition and 16 
are buyouts of listing company. Empirical results show that the management buyouts 
acquiring parent companies have significant negative CAR in both windows and are 
significantly more negative than those using direct purchase of listing companies in 
window of [-1,1]. 
The results are in line with our expectation since the share acquisition of parent 
companies is not as transparent as direct MBO of listing companies. The ratio of 
control right/share stake is usually larger than 1 through controlling chain which could 
be rather complicated. Furthermore the fairness of share pricing of parent companies 
is difficult to judge due to limited disclosure of interests about parent companies. 
Therefore MBOs of parent companies are considered to be more corruptive. 
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4.3.3. ESOP participation: Yes/No. 
ESOP (Employee stock ownership plan) is a kind of employee benefit plan covering 
not only the management but also general employees. Some cases of MBO are 
conducted under the name of ESOP and actually the leader of ESOP Association, 
usually the top management, could obtain the controlling right over company. 
In the sample of apparent MBO, the deals participated by ESOP amount to 17 cases. 
Empirical results show that group of MBO without ESOP have significant negative 
CAR while group of MBO with ESOP have negative CAR on average but 
insignificant. The former is significantly more negative than the latter in window of 
[-5， 5]. 
Therefore the participation of ESOP could be regarded as a less negative factor in 
MBO. A possible reason is that ESOP was believed to be a good incentive for both 
management and employees which may lead to overall high operating efficiency. 
4.3.4. Competitive purchaser: Yes/No. 
During the transferring of shares, the transaction seems to be more transparent and 
fair with the presence of competitive purchaser. However most MBO are conducted 
based on negotiation between vendor and purchaser (the management) without public 
competition. 
In our sample, only 6 MBO cases are involved with competitive purchaser. Compared 
with others without competitors, the 6 deals have greater negative CAR. A possible 
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reason is that investors believe the outside purchasers are not acquainted with the 
company and may destroy it if they acquire control right. However we would not 
conclude that competitive purchaser is a negative factor to announcement effect due 
to the small sample of competitive MBO. 
4.3.5. Results: Success / Failure. 
The transferring of State Shares and Legal Shares of SOEs should get approval from 
the government and/or CSRC. Some were defeated because of certain considerations. 
Generally speaking, it is unknown whether it will success or not when MBO is 
initially announced. 
We test the CAR to see if it will give any indication for the results of MBO. The 
group of failure is a small sample with 6 constitutes. It is shown that both groups have 
negative average CAR and the failed MBO has greater negative mean and median 
than successful MBOs in both windows. We infer that the failed deals may include 
some unreasonable terms that disappointed the investors and thus be denied by 
* 
regulation institutions. 
4.3.6. Correlation between the factors 
We calculate the correlation of the above five factors to examine whether there is any 
intrinsic relationship between them. All the factors are represented by dummy 
variables and the state leading to more negative effect is set to be 1. (See Table 5) 
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The largest correlation is 0.73 between year and underlying assets. Before 2003 
77.8% of the MBO deals adopt the share transfer of listing companies. Since the MoF 
prohibited MBO in 2003, however, 93.1% of the deals employ the share acquisition of 
parent companies (See Table 6). It could be inferred that the share acquisition of 
parent companies is an evasive strategy against the government prohibition. 
The correlation between other dummy variables are no larger than 0.2, indicating no 
significant relevance among others. 
4.4. Summary of announcement effect 
Apparent MBO have significant negative CAR around initial announcement date 
which indicates investor's pessimistic attitude towards MBO. However the founder 
buyouts have positive announcement effect reflecting the public approval of 
founder-controller. Among apparent MBOs, the following factors may lead to more 
negative announcement effect: conduct year after 2003, share purchase of parent 
company and no participation of ESOP. 
5. Evidence on profitability and pricing 
In last section it is demonstrated that investors hold pessimistic attitude towards MBO. 
Why? On the one hand, since stock price mainly reflect the investors' expectation 
about future profitability of the company, the negative announcement effect indicates 
investor's misgivings about the post-MBO earning capacities. On the other hand, 
unfair price of share transferring could also cause abnormal fluctuation of stock price. 
In this section we will test whether there are any profitability changes and price 
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manipulation around MBO. 
5.1. Data and methodology 
In this section our research sample includes all types of MBO companies except 
subsidiary MBO. The reason that we exclude subsidiary MBO is the infeasibility to 
follow the results of those MBO targets (the subsidiaries of listing companies) from 
financial reports of listing companies. In other words, we are focusing on the earning 
and asset change of MBO targets. This sample includes 77 listing companies. 
Data source 
All the A share listcos in Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges are extracted from 
CSMAR by classification of CSRC industry code. We will compare various financial 
measures between MBO companies and their peers of the same industry. 
Variables 
We construct two variables for each financial measure. The first, which is called 
industry adjusted variable, uses the company measure contracted by industry median 
to indicate the company ranking within industry (outperformer or underperformer). 
And the second, which is called change in industry adjusted variable, uses the 
difference of industry adjusted variable between current year and last year to reflect 
the change of company compared with itself year by year. The second variable 
methodology is similar as Wu (1997). 
For example, we construct the following variables in ROE test: 
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DADJROE., = ADJROE.,-ADJROE.,_, 
where 
/?(9£,. ,= firmi's ROE at year t 
median ROE. , for the CSRC industry. 
To strip out industry factor each variable is adjusted by contracting industry median 
value. ADJROEi, is an absolute variable to indicate the company performance 
compared with industry and DADJROE^, is a relative variable to reflect the 
performance change year by year. 
Observation window 
The observation window is set to be five-year respectively before and after MBO. It 
should be noted that in some cases MBO lasts for more than one year (from initial 
announcement of MBO intention to the announcement of MBO completion) and the 
window starts 5 years before the beginning year of MBO and ends 5 years after the 
completion year. 
The event year T is the completion year for successful MBO and announcement year 
of failure for failed MBO. For the losers who did not announce their failure, T is set to 
be the initial announcement year. 
Statistic tests 
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We conduct Student t test and Wilcoxon test to observe whether the MBO companies 
have significantly different performances for the financial measures. Before statistic 
tests, we remove some abnormal observations to mitigate the interference of noises. 
The methodology is to abandon the observations that are beyond the distance of 
double variation from the average and repeat once more. 
5.2. Profitability of MBO companies 
MBO in China is boosted as company restructuring and management incentive. 
Since the management usually knows the company well and could carry out smooth 
transition after takeover, MBO are supposed to bring better profitability. Could MBO 
really improve the profitability of company? 
Return on equity is an important ratio to measure the earning capacity of a company. 
We use this measure to investigate the profitability change around MBO events. (See 
Table 7 and Table 8) 
The results indicate no improvement of profitability, if not worse. From T-4 to T+2 
the overall industry adjusted ROE (ADJROE) are significant positive which indicates 
that the MBO companies outperform the industry. Since T+4，however, the mean and 
median both turned into negative, which implies that the companies underperform the 
industry. 
As for the change in industry adjusted ROE (DADJROE), the average and median are 
positive in T-1. After MBO completion, however, a majority of the observations are 
negative. In particular it is significantly negative for the first year after MBO. 
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In other words, the companies to conduct MBO were originally good firms with 
higher ROE than the industry average. After MBO, however, the ROE increase 
becomes slower than industry level and the advantage gradually disappears. Since the 
4th year after MBO, the companies on average turned from industry outperformer to 
underperformer. We could infer that the profitability do deteriorate after MBO which 
verifies investor's misgivings. 
Another interesting result is the difference between successful MBO companies and 
failed ones. The former have significant positive ADJROE from T-4 to T but the later 
do not. As a matter of fact the losers have negative mean and median of ADJROE 
during this period which indicates that they are industry underperformers. Thus we 
could suppose that companies with poor profitability are difficult to get approval on 
MBO. 
5.3. DuPont analysis of companies with successful MBO 
To follow up the ROE results, we conduct DuPont analysis to recognize the 
underlying drivers for the change of profitability. We utilize the three-factor DuPont 
system as following: 
ROE= Net Margin * Asset Turnover * Equity Multiplier 
To concentrate on the post-MBO performance, we focus on the sub sample of 
successful MBO transactions, which includes 69 companies in total. The net margin, 
asset turnover and equity multiplier are tested individually for industry adjusted ratios 
and annual changes. (See Table 9 and Table 10) 
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The net margin performance is entirely different before and after the MBO event. 
Before MBO, the companies have significant higher margin than the industry average. 
But after MBO, the advantage disappears with net margin largely in line with the 
industry average. Moreover the test results on annual changes suggest that the net 
margin significantly decreases for the first two years immediately after MBO, which 
reflected rising expenses and poor inside controlling. 
The asset turnover performance is quite similar as the net margin. The companies 
have significant outperforming asset turnover before MBO, but lose their superiority 
thereafter. The annual change in risk adjusted asset turnover acts even more quickly, 
which turns into significantly negative just in the event year and remain so for the 
following year. 
The test on equity multiplier posts a remarkable result that the leverage has kept 
increasing ever since one year before MBO. Before T-2, the leverage ratio of MBO 
companies is largely in line with industry average. But since the transaction 
completion year, it becomes significantly higher than the industry. In particular the 
annual change data demonstrated significant increase of equity multiplier during T-1 
to T+3, reflecting an abnormal accelerated accrual of liability. This is not an 
advantage for the company due to Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) which reported 
negative relation between leverage and future growth. 
The DuPont analysis provides further clarity on profitability consequences of 
successful MBO: lower net margin, lower asset turnover, and higher leverage ratio, 
after adjusted by industry average. All the changes are unfavorable signals for the 
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profitability of company, leading to weakened earning capability and sluggish future 
growth. Moreover the increasing leverage put heavy debt burden on the company 
which may result in financial crisis and harm the interests of minority shareholders. 
The empirical results demonstrate that MBO in China did not improve the company 
profitability as boosted, but caused weakened earning capacity and rising financial 
risk. 
5.4. Dividend payment 
Dividend policy is an important part of the operating strategy of a company. Dividend 
payout of MBO companies is especially concerned by the public as this is the most 
direct way for the management to acquire cash benefits from shareholdings. We test 
two dividend ratios, the payout ratio and dividend yield, to see whether there is any 
particular characteristics in the dividend policy of companies that have completed 
MBO. (See Table 11 and Table 12) 
The dividends paid by post-MBO companies are impressively higher than the industry 
level, both in the measure of dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. In the MBO 
completion year, the dividend payout ratio significantly surges up 16.6ppt on average 
over the industry level. The remarkably high payout ratio maintains for the 
subsequent three years. 
The aggressive dividend payout is not a moderate strategy for company growth 
(Faccio，Lang and Young (2001)). Large amount of cash payout would decrease the 
cash position and cut down reinvestment in operation activities. Indistinctive ROE 
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and extraordinary high dividend payout predestinate inferior earning capacity. It is 
possible that the management is anxious to receive cash-out from the company to 
cover the repayment of MBO financing. But the pursuance of quick benefits would 
greatly undermine the long-term earning growth of the company. An insider trading 
around dividend announcement may also cause deficiencies. (John and Lang (1991)). 
5.5. Shareholder's returns 
Different from non-tradable shareholders, the secondary-market investors are more 
concerned about stock price returns. Thus we examine the post-MBO performance of 
annual holding returns, as well as the revenue and earning growth. (See Table 13 and 
Table 14) 
It is found that the total stock returns outrun the industry for the first two years after 
MBO completion, which is probably motivated by the superior top and bottom line 
growth. Since the 3'"'^  year the operating advantages pass off and the holding return 
becomes indifferent to others. 
In addition, the revenue and earning growth before MBO is notably higher than the 
industry level but incurred significant decrease after MBO, which double confirms 
our judgment of deteriorating operations after MBO. 
A special caption here is that we interpret the total return change with illustration of 
revenue growth and earning growth, but do not indicate any consequential 
relationship between stock returns and operating results. Good operating results may 
spur stock price but do not necessarily result in higher growth. 
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5.6. MBO pricing and pre-MBO behavior of NAV 
According to the regulations issued by SASAC in 1997，state assets must not be 
transferred at the price lower than net asset value (NAV). Since then NAV is the 
common measure of state assets and over half of MBO transactions in China are 
priced with NAV. We conduct a test to observe pre-MBO behavior of NAV. (See 
Table 15 and Table 16) 
MBO companies have significant higher growth of NAV than industry level from T-4 
to T, which again confirms our inference that the companies were industry 
outperformers before MBO. The average change in NAV growth has kept negative 
from T-3 and T-1，but turns into positive in T. In T-1 it is even significant negative. 
This is especially obvious in the group of listing company MBO with NAV pricing. 
Recalling the discussion of leverage ratio in DuPont analysis, the increasing leverage 
also implicates a decreasing net asset ratio, which is consistent with our findings. 
The empirical results suggest that the companies under MBO plan were industry 
outperformers with fast growth of NAV. Since three years before MBO, however, 
their average growth in excess of industry average keeps decreasing. In particular the 
growth incurs significant decrease in the year before MBO. This is an obvious signal 
of net asset value manipulation before MBO leading to a lower price in share transfer. 
It is reasonable that the manipulated share price of MBO transaction would provoke 
abnormal change of stock price. 
6. Conclusion 
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We collected the announcement information of 114 MBO transactions of 85 China 
listing companies during 1997-2007. The initial announcement effect of apparent 
MBO is significant negative, reflecting investors' pessimistic attitude towards 
MBO. Some factors may lead to more negative announcement effect, including 
announcement year after 2003, acquisition of parent company, no ESOP participation, 
etc. The negative attitude comes from two main concerns: profitability and share 
transfer price. Empirical results suggest that the MBO companies, which were 
originally good firms with outperforming profitability, incur lower net margin, lower 
asset turnover, increasing leverage ratio and extraordinary high dividend payout after 
MBO, which severely undermines the earning capacities. The net asset value is found 
to be significantly manipulated down before MBO which is probably meant to depress 
the transfer share price in MBO transaction. 
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Table 1. MBO of China listing companies (to be continued) 
T. , V, Annouce- Underlying Succeed Compe- Acquired Control ^ 
Ticker Name ^ent date asset [SOP 超 ^ n stake (%) ri.ht (%) 丁^^ e 
000009 深宝安 20060109 parent N succeed N 11.64 11.64 Close to NTS Reform 
000023 深天地A 20030226 parent Y succeed N 29.68 40.00 Apparent MBO 
000023 深天地A 20071031 parent Y succeed N 6.76 33.81 Apparent MBO 
000035 中科健 20031017 parent N succeed Y 29.01 29.01 Apparent MBO 
000049 德赛电池 20040203 parent Y succeed N 30.14 61.52 Ute announcement 
000055 深方大 20010620 self Y succeed N 33.10 44.70 Apparent MBO 
000062 深圳华强 20031009 parent N succeed N 47.78 52.50 Apparent MBO 
000157 中联重科 20041118 parent N succeed N 2.94 5.90 Apparent MBO 
000157 中联重科 20060331 parent N succeed Y 12.01 30.00 Close to NTS Reform 
000301 丝铜股份 20031204 parent N fail N 62.44 62.44 Apparent MBO 
000407 胜利股份 20020917 self N succeed N 6.85 6.85 Apparent MBO 
000407 胜利股份 20021112 self N succeed N 10.80 17.65 Apparent MBO 
000513 丽珠集团 20010105 self Y fail N 12.72 12.72 Apparent MBO 
000513 丽珠集团 20010926 self Y succeed N 3.57 7.31 Apparent MBO 
000527 美的电器 19990604 self N succeed N 7.98 7.98 Apparent MBO 
000527 美的电器 20000419 self Y succeed N 7.26 15.75 Apparent MBO 
000527 美的电器 20010119 self Y succeed N 14.94 30.69 Apparent MBO 
000533 万家乐 20010529 self N succeed N 18.72 18.72 Apparent MBO 
000533 万家乐 20010608 self N succeed Y 6.22 24.94 Apparent MBO 
000542 TCL通讯 20020417 self Y succeed N 25.00 25.00 Late announcement 
000571 新大洲 A 20050218 parent N succeed N 4.08 15.09 Late announcement 
000585 东北电气 20040909 parent N succeed N 21.59 26.34 Apparent MBO 
000585 东北电气 20050518 parent N succeed N 8.22 26.34 Apparent MBO 
000619 海煤型材 20040222 parent Y succeed N 16.87 42.50 Apparent MBO 
000623 吉林敌东 20021101 self N succeed N 16.26 26.64 Veiled MBO 
000661 长春高新 20031217 subsidiary N succeed Y - - Subsidiary disposal 
000667 名流置业 20070611 parent N succeed N 7.53 18.82 Apparent MBO 
000672 铜城集团 20041227 self N fail N 25.96 25.96 Veiled MBO 
000677 山东海龙 20040907 self N succeed N 8.75 8.75 Apparent MBO 
000677 山东海龙 20041207 self N succeed N 20.47 29.22 Apparent MBO 
000683 天然磁 20051227 self N succeed N 26.52 26.52 Veiled MBO 
000725 京东方A 20040529 parent N succeed Y 15.71 35.91 Apparent MBO 
000735 罗牛山 20040207 parent Y succeed N 15.45 15.45 Apparent MBO 
000780 草原兴发 20020307 parent N succeed N 12.65 24.81 Veiled MBO 
000780 草原兴发 20031008 parent N succeed N 25.29 50.10 Veiled MBO 
000790 华神集团 20040701 self N succeed N 28.13 28.13 Veiled MBO 
000869 张裕A 20041102 parent N succeed Y 24.23 45.00 Apparent MBO 
000895 双汇发展 20030617 self N succeed N 25.00 25.00 Veiled MBO 
000910 大亚科技 20041220 parent N succeed N 11.83 29.58 Founder buyout 
000922 阿继电器 20021207 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
000925 浙大海纳 20030108 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
000939 凯迪电力 2003 丨223 self N succeed N 13.40 13.40 Veiled MBO 
000973 佛塑股份 20020801 self N succeed N 29.46 29.46 Apparent MBO 
000995 皇台酒业 20050828 self N succeed N 29.00 29.00 Late announcement 
600066 宇通客车 20010525 self N succeed N 8.70 8.70 Apparent MBO 
600066 宇通客车 20010622 parent N fail N 15.44 17.19 Apparent MBO 
600066 宇通客车 20040105 parent N succeed N 17.19 17.19 Apparent MBO 
600084 新天国际 20001205 self Y fail N 14.92 14.92 Apparent MBO 
600089 特变电工 20020926 self N succeed N 11.46 11.46 Apparent MBO 
600089 特变电工 20030129 parent N succeed N 16.18 27.64 Apparent MBO 
600105 永ffi光缆 20020405 parent N succeed N 37.07 49.86 Apparent MBO 
600152 维科精华 20030311 parent Y succeed N 11.44 32.36 Veiled MBO 
600152 维科精华 20060816 parent N succeed N 11.26 24.28 Apparent MBO 
600162 山东临工 20021227 self N succeed N 27.06 27.06 Veiled MBO 
600162 山东临工 20070203 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600186 莲花味精 20060601 self N succeed N 8.85 8.85 Veiled MBO 
600193 创兴科技 20021114 parent N succeed N 32.71 49.59 Apparent MBO 
600200 江苏吴中 20030917 parent N succetxl N 21.70 36.16 Apparent MBO 
600201 金宇集团 20050630 parent Y succeed N 11.47 24.99 Apparent MBO 
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Table 1. MBO Sample of Chinese listed companies 
. , ^ Annouce- Underlying Succeed Compe- Acquired Control 
licner Name ment date asset /Fail tetion stake (%) right (%) ^ 
600216 浙江医药 2006m26 parent N succeed N 29.65 29.65 Late announcement 
600237 铜峰电子 20031013 parent N succeed Y 7.20 7.70 Apparent MBO 
600237 铜峰电子 20040325 parent N fail N 14.80 22.70 Apparent MBO 
600238 海南椰岛 20050205 self N succeed N 6.03 6.03 Veiled MBO 
600257 洞庭水殖 20020204 self N succeed N 13.65 29.90 Apparent MBO 
600267 海正药业 20040227 parent N succeed N 22.15 39.86 Apparent MBO 
600275 武昌鱼 20050427 parent N succeed N 16.91 27.12 Late announcement 
600276 恒瑞医药 20030325 self N succeed N 37.15 37.15 Apparent MBO 
600276 恒瑞医药 20060224 self N succeed N 6.00 43.15 Apparent MBO 
600295 鄂尔多斯 20021016 parent N succeed N 18.84 43.80 Apparent MBO 
600297 美罗药业 20040112 parent N succeed N 32.96 52.00 Veiled MBO 
600308 华泰股份 20051123 parent N succeed N 17.91 29.85 Apparent MBO 
600319 亚星化学 20041231 parent N succeed N 21.99 44.87 Late announcement 
600351 亚宝药业 20041012 parent N succeed N 16.68 23.83 Apparent MBO 
600370 三房巷 200603 丨 6 parent N succeed N 34.74 63.62 Apparent MBO 
600400 红豆股份 20031202 parent Y succeed N 12.04 70.27 Founder buyout 
600449 赛马实业 20051116 parent N succeed N 27.79 27.79 Apparent MBO 
600486 扬农化工 20030401 parent Y succeed N 26.33 55.79 Apparent MBO 
600502 安徽水利 20040305 parent N fail N 27.14 27.14 Apparent MBO 
600522 中天科技 20050204 parent N succeed N 25.20 38.00 Apparent MBO 
600522 中天科技 20050720 parent N succeed N 10.29 57.40 Late announcement 
600522 中天科技 2006M26 parent N succeed N 7.35 57.40 Late announcement 
600522 中天科技 20060829 parent N succeed N 7.28 48.90 Apparent MBO 
600531 豫光金铅 20040909 parent N fail Y 29.03 51.00 Apparent MBO 
600533 栖苗建设 20040825 parent Y succeed N 23.80 48.57 Apparent MBO 
600557 康缘药业 20040209 self N succeed N 8.46 25.39 Founder buyout 
600557 康缘药业 20041229 self N succeed N 0.52 25.39 Founder buyout 
600557 康缘药业 20050808 self N succeed N 8.65 34.04 Founder buyout 
600557 康缘药业 20050926 self N succeed N 9.50 43.54 Close to NTS Reform 
600572 康恩贝 20041029 parent N succeed N 2.69 30.13 Founder buyout 
600572 康恩贝 20041126 parent Y succeed N 12.05 30.13 Apparent MBO 
600585 海螺水泥 20040222 parent Y succeed N 24.29 49.00 Apparent MBO 
600585 海螺水泥 20060822 self Y succeed N 8.65 48.09 Apparent MBO 
600586 金晶科技 20040922 parent N succeed N 31.59 61.95 Veiled MBO 
600595 中孕实业 20051231 parent Y succeed N 6.35 21.20 Apparent MBO 
600606 金丰投资 20021018 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600606 金丰投资 20030317 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600606 金丰投资 20030422 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600606 金丰投资 20041124 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600611 大众交通 19990525 self Y succeed N 5.21 23.41 Apparent MBO 
600635 大众公用 19970507 self Y succeed N 18.07 20.08 Apparent MBO 
600645 望春花 19980303 self Y succeed N 9.60 9.60 Apparent MBO 
600662 强生控股 20020208 parent Y succeed N 11.50 32.87 Late announcement 
600668 尖峰集团 20001225 self N fail N 31.62 38.36 Veiled MBO 
600668 尖峰集团 20030902 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600671 天目药业 20000629 parent Y fail N 30.16 45.03 Apparent MBO 
600682 南京新百 20030815 subsidiary N fail N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600683 银泰股份 20020921 parent N succeed N 3.43 21.41 Founder buyout 
600684 珠江实业 20040823 subsidiary N fail N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600734 实达电脑 20040906 subsidiary Y fail N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600768 宁波富邦 20021104 self Y succeed Y 21.53 28.70 Apparent MBO 
600779 全兴股份 20030215 parent Y succeed N 38.75 48.44 Veiled MBO 
600823 万象集团 200 丨 0115 subsidiary N succeed N - - Subsidiary disposal 
600868 梅雁水电 20041014 parent Y succeed N 2.42 10.39 Apparent MBO 
600884 杉杉股份 20070321 parent N succeed N 11.82 36.71 Founder buyout 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the announcements of MBO in China during 1997-2007 
The sample consists of 114 MBO announcements of 85 China listing companies covering the 
period of 1997-2007. We made a screening of the Chinese listed companies that were reported to have 
conducted MBO and check the share transaction in public announcement. The final sample includes 
those MBO transactions satisfying at least one of the following criteria: (1) The management purchase 
over 10% stake of the company or (2) A single manager purchase over 1% stake of the company or (3) 
Management acquire the control right of over 5% via the "shell" company. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistic Mean Median 
Market cap (in RMB mn) 2,797.62 1,947.60 
Free float (in RMB mn) 1,009.73 852.09 
Percentage of Free float 40.89 39.62 
Total assets (in RMB mn) 2,203.73 1,579.23 
Shareholder's equity (in RMB mn) 863.07 650.29 
Panel B: Calendar profile 
，， Number of Mean market cap . . „ „ ^ 
Year ‘ . Mean free float (%) 
annoucements (RMB mn) 
1997 1 3712.30 44.44% 
1998 1 322.79 22.12% 
1999 2 4271.31 31.50% 
2000 4 3888.87 49.44% 
2001 9 4089.95 45.07% 
2002 17 2539.10 43.39% 
2003 21 2216.21 42.34% 
2004 31 2996.78 36.65% 
2005 14 1105.20 40.29% 
2006 10 3299.13 39.43% 
2007 4 4444.83 51.96% 
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Table 3. CAR of initial announcement of MBO 
The sample consists of 85 initial announcements of MBO. The conventional event-time methodology is 
used to estimate the market effect. In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the 
sample size and figures in grey imply the number of events with positive CAR v.s. the number of 
events with negative CAR. In the column of "Mean" figures in black are average CAR (%) of the 
sample and figures in bracket is the t-statistics in student t test. In the column of "Median", figures in 
black are median CAR (%) of the sample and the figures in bracket is the Wilcoxon Z statistic in 
Wilcoxon test. 
CAR卜 1，11 CAFM-5，51 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
85 07i6 OT4 85 0 ? 7 ^ ^ 
All 46:39 (0.37) (1870) 56:58 (0.48) (1808) 
47 -0.89 -0.72 47 -2.26 -0.97 
Apparent MBO 20:27 ( -2 .04 )** (390) ** 16:31 ( -2 .71 )*** (342)**=" 
, , . 1 5 0.79 1.48 15 3.12 1.36 
Veiled MBO ():(’ （(口3) (()()) 9：6 (1.75；* ( 8 7 ) * 
8 2.70 0.90 8 5.62 -1.20 
LateAnnoucement 6:2 (0.99) (26) 3:5 (0.76) (17) 
^ ^ 8 0.23 0.70 8 1.76 1.90 
Subsidiary Disposal 5.3 ,o.23) (19) 4:4 (0.54) (21) 
^ � L 6 2.45 2.73 6 5.65 5.52 
Founder buyout 5., O.IS) ** (20) ** 6:0 ( 3 . 4 0 ) * * * ( 2 ] ) ** 
^ 1 0.05 0.05 1 0.06 0.06 
NTS reform 丨 1 . 0 
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Table 4. CAR of initial announcement of Apparent MBO 
The sample consists of 47 initial announcements of apparent MBO. The conventional event-time 
methodology is used to estimate the market effect. The difference between comparable groups is also 
tested. In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the sample size and figures in grey 
imply the number of events with positive CAR v.s. the number of events with negative CAR. In the 
column of "Mean" figures in black are average CAR (%) of the sample and figures in bracket is the 
t-statistics in student t test. In the column of "Median", figures in black are median CAR (%) of the 
sample and the figures in bracket is the Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
CAR 卜 1,11 CAR 卜 5,51 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
Apparent 47 ^ ^ 47 ^ ^ 
MBO 20:27 ( - 2 . 0 4 ) * * ( 3 9 0 ) * * 16:31 ( -2 .71 )*** G42) 
D . 糊 , 18 -0.22 -0.67 18 -1.20 -0.22 
Before 2003 ( _ ( � ( ( > ( ) > 卜�()5) 口 
„ 29 -1.31 -0.72 29 -2.92 -2.58 
Year Alter zuuj 13：16 (-2.05) ** (137) ** 8:21 (-2.54) *** (114) ** 
— 1.10 0.06 — 1.72 2.36 
Difference — ( ^ ^ g j * (296) — (1.07) (303) 
31 -1.31 -0.72 31 -2.38 -1.48 
nt 13:18 (-2.18) ** ( 1 4 8 ) * * 9:22 ( - 2 . 2 9 ) * * ( 1 4 0 ) * * 
Underlying 16 -0.10 -0.37 16 -2.03 -0.22 
asset 7:9 (-0.18) (61) 7:9 (-1.41) * (49) 
_ -1.21 -0.36 — -0.36 -1.26 
Difference — 丨.52) * (203) — (-0.20) (236) 
17 -0.60 -0.90 17 -0.38 1.92 
Yes 6:11 (-1.15) (52) 9:8 (-0.28) (70) 
30 -1.06 -0.66 30 -3.33 -2.49 
ESOP No 14:16 (.].70) * (167) * 7:23 (-3.26) *** (92} 
— 0.47 -0.24 — 2.95 4.41 
Difference — (() 5幻 (244) — (1.74) ** (327; * 
6 -4.24 -2.64 6 -3.57 -2.53 
� : 5 (-2.13) ** (1) ** 1:5 I-! .47} ( 3 ” 
Competitive 41 -0.40 -0.60 41 -2.07 -0.97 
purchaser 19:22 (-1,10) (347) 15:26 ( - 2 . 3 1 ) * * ( 2 7 7 ) * * 
— -3.84 -2.04 -1.50 -1.56 
Difference — 卜丨’如）* (62) ** (-0.58) (108) 
6 -2.71 -1.31 6 -2.41 -1.75 
Failure 1：5 ( - 1 3 5 ) (4) 3:3 (-0.85) (6} 
Failure 41 -0.63 -0.64 41 -2.24 -0.97 
/success Success 19：22 f-1.54) * (319) * 13:28 f-2.56) *** ( 2 5 4 ) * * 
-2.08 -0.67 -0.17 -0.78 
Di^ r^ence — (_�卿 哪） (-0.06) (128) 
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Table 5. Correlation between variables 
The sample consists of 47 initial announcements of apparent MBO. Every factor is represented by a 
dummy variable and the state in brackets is defined as 1. Pearson's correlation coefficients are 
displayed in the table. 
Year (>=2003) Und了lying t ^ ^ i o n Results (fail) / ^ P ^ t i t i v e 
\ assets (parent) . . Purchaser (Yes) 
M 
Year (>=2003) 1.00 0.73 0.14 -0.09 0.17 
Underlying ^^^ i.oO 0.11 0.01 0.14 
assets (parent) 
ESOP 
participation 0.14 0.11 1.00 -0.11 0.16 
(no) 
Results (fail) -0.09 0.01 -0.11 1.00 0.04 
Competitive � 口 0 o . l 6 0.04 1.00 
Purchaser (Yes) 
45 
Table 6. Announcement year v.s. underlying assets 
The sample consists of 47 initial announcements of apparent MBO. The vertical line illustrates 
announcement year and the horizontal line illustrates underlying asset. The number in table represents 
the number of companies that meet the year and underlying assets requirement. 
Parent Self Total 
Before 2003 4 14 18 
After 2003 (include 2003) 27 2 29 
Total 31 16 47 
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Table 7. Statistics of industry adjusted ROE (ADJROE) 
The sample consists of 77 companies conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except subsidiary 
disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive ADJROE v.s. the number of effective events with negative ADJROE. In the column of "Mean" 
figures in black are average ADJROE (%) of the sample and figures in bracket is the t-statistics in 
student t test. In the column of "Median", figures in black are median ADJROE (%) of the sample and 
the figures in bracket is the Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
All Success Failure 
Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
f h 37/42 ^005 0 5 5 34/39 ^ i l o 0 2 8 m ^ LSI 
19:15 (-0 .06 ) ( 3 2 9 ) 17:14 (-0 .13) ( 2 7 0 ) 2:1 ( 0 . 3 4 ) ( 4 ) 
T-4 43/49 1.56 1.49 40/46 1.73 1.57 3/3 -0.74 -0.82 
2 6 : 1 3 ( 2 . 7 8 ) * * * ( 3 7 6 ) * * * 26 : 10 ( 2 . 9 1 } * * * ( 5 0 5 ) * * * ():? ( . 2 . 0 7 ) * ( 0 ) 
T-3 58/65 1.69 0.91 54/60 1.85 1.25 5/5 -6.01 -0.42 
3 7 : 1 8 ( 2 . 8 4 ) * * * ( 1 1 0 2 ) * * * 3 5 : 1 6 ( 2 . 9 3 ) * * * ( 9 7 1 ) * * * 2 :3 (••1.09) ( 4 ) 
T-2 64/72 0.97 0.93 58/66 1.09 1.06 6/6 -0.23 -0.06 
3 6 : 2 6 ( 1 . 9 0 ) * * ( 1 2 3 7 ) * * 34 :22 ( 1 . % ) * * ( 1 0 3 1 ) * * 2 : 4 (-0 .29 ) ( 9 ) 
T-1 69/75 1.36 0.88 63/68 1.58 1.42 6/7 -0.92 -0.92 
4 2 : 2 5 ( 2 . S 3 j * * * ( 1 5 5 9 ) * * * 40 :21 ( 3 . 0 6 ) * * * ( n 4 5 ) * * * 2 :4 (-1 .65 ) * ( 4 ) 
T 70/74 1.61 1.16 64/68 1.65 1.24 6/6 1.19 1.14 
4 3 : 2 7 ( 2 . 1 9 ) * * ( 1 6 1 1 ) * * 3 8 : 2 6 ( 2 . 0 9 ) * * ( 1 3 3 8 ) * * 5:1 ( 0 . 7 2 ) ( 1 6 ) 
T+1 57/65 1.45 1.36 54/59 1.92 1.41 6/6 -0.48 1.11 
36 :21 ( 2 . 0 5 ) * * ( 1 0 3 6 ) * * 34 :20 ( 2 . 2 9 ) * * ( 9 6 6 ) * * 4 : 2 (-0 .29 ) ( 1 0 ) 
T+2 46/55 0.88 1.46 40/49 0.82 1.34 6/6 1.23 1.78 
2 7 : 1 9 ( 1 . 35 } * ( 6 7 6 ) * 2 3 : 17 ( 1 . 1 5 ) ( 5 0 5 ) 4 :2 ( 0 . 7 9 ) ( 1 5 ) 
T+3 37/40 0.71 1.19 33/36 1.34 1.72 4/4 -4.48 -3.42 
2 2 : 1 4 ( 0 . 7 0 ) ( 3 8 7 ) 21 :11 ( 1 . 2 9 ) ( 3 3 6 ) * 1:3 (••1.62) ( 2 ) 
T+4 22/25 -0.68 -0.16 20/22 -1.81 0.56 3/3 -2.52 -2.50 
10:12 (-0 .43 ) ( 1 2 9 ) 10:10 (-0 .80 ) ( 1 0 7 ) 0 :3 (-2 .42 ) * ( 0 ) 
T+5 11/11 -2.24 -0.65 9/9 -2.14 -0.36 2/2 -2.68 -2.68 
4 : 7 (-1 .31 ) ( 1 9 ) 4 : 5 (-1 .03 ) ( 1 6 ) 0 :2 (- ] . 32 ) ( 0 ) 
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Table 8. Statistics of change in industry adjusted ROE (DADJROE) 
The sample consists of 77 companies conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except subsidiary 
disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive DADJROE v.s. the number of effective events with negative DADJROE. In the column of 
"Mean" figures in black are average DADJROE (%) of the sample and figures in bracket is the 
t-statistics in student t test. In the column of "Median", figures in black are median DADJROE (%) of 
the sample and the figures in bracket is the Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
, , All Success Failure 
Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
T ^ 27/32 T T o i m Jn> S 
6 : 1 9 ( -2 . 60 ) * * * ( 7 7 ) * * 5 :17 (-3 .02 ) * * * ( 4 6 ) * * * 1:2 (0.(A) ( 3 ) 
T-4 37/42 -0.43 0.63 34/39 -0.35 0.67 3/3 -1.28 -1.60 
2 0 : 1 5 (-0 . 55 ) ( 3 0 5 ) (-0 .42 ) ( 2 6 2 ) 1:2 (-0 .77) ( 2 ) 
T-3 42/49 0.27 0.00 40/46 0.26 -0.03 3/3 -8.51 0.39 
2 0 : 2 0 ( 0 . 3 8 ) 1 4 3 ? ) 18:20 ( 0 . 3 4 ) (3 84} 2:1 (-0 .94) ( ? ) 
T-2 58/65 -0.25 -0.24 54/60 -0.35 -0.39 5/5 5.74 0.60 
2 5 : 3 3 ( -0 . 46 ) ( 8 0 8 ) 2 2 : 3 2 (-0 .62 ) ( 6 7 9 ) 4;1 ( 1 , 2 2 ) ( 1 2 ) 
T-1 65/71 0.28 0.16 60/65 0.43 0.42 5/6 -1.61 -1.55 
3 4 : 3 0 10 .52 ) ( 1 1 2 6 ) 3 3 : 2 6 ( 0 . 7 7 ) ( 1 0 2 0 ) 1:4 (-1.95} * ⑴ * 
T 67/73 -0.30 0.38 61/67 -0.54 0.35 6/6 2.11 1.68 
3 9 : 2 8 (-0 . 49 ) ( 1 1 6 6 ) 3 4 : 2 7 f-().82) ( 9 1 4 ) 5:1 ( 1 . 41 ) ( 1 7 ) 
T+1 59/65 -0.80 -0.18 54/59 -1.09 -0.16 6/6 -1.67 -1.78 
2 7 : 3 2 f -1 . 36 ) * ( 7 7 1 ) 2 5 : 2 9 (-1 .47) * ( 6 5 7 ) 2 : 4 ^-1.34) ( 4 ) 
T+2 46/55 -0.53 -0.23 40/49 -0.86 -0.58 6/6 1.71 0.44 
21 : 25 (-0 . 5S ) ( 4 8 6 ) 18:22 (-0 .84 ) (336^ 3:3 f l . 3 3 ) ( 1 4 ) 
T+3 37/40 0.01 -0.98 33/36 0.53 -0.69 4/4 -4.35 -4.65 
14:23 ( 0 . 0 0 ) ( 2 9 5 ) 14:19 ( 0 . 3 9 ) ( 2 6 7 ) 0 :4 (-4 .08) * ( 0 ) * 
T+4 22/25 -1.88 -0.66 19/22 -2.36 -0.61 3/3 1.19 -0.70 
9 :13 ( -1 . 05 ) ( 1 0 0 ) 8:11 (-1 .19 ) ( 7 1 ) 1:2 ( 0 . 30 ) ( 3 ) 
T+5 9/11 2.74 -1.11 8/9 7.89 0.32 2/2 -1.06 -1.06 
4 : 5 ( 0 . 9 6 ) ( 2 3 ) 4 : 4 ( 1 . 5 4 ) * ( 2 5 ) i : l (-0 .93 ) ⑴ 
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Table 12. Statistics of change in industry adjusted dividend ratios 
The sample consists of 69 companies successfully conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except 
subsidiary disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive ratio v.s. the number of effective events with negative ratio. In the column of "Mean" figures 
in black are mean value of the sample and figures in bracket is the t-statistics in student t test. In the 
column of "Median", figures in black are median value of the sample and the figures in bracket is the 
Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
Net margin Asset turnover Asset/Equity 
Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
T ^ 59/65 I 3 1 49/53 61/65 ^ ^oTo 
？9:20 (3.05) *** (1224) *** 24:25 (0.37) (609) 29:32 ((1.97) (1034) 
T-4 61/68 1.79 1.70 60/65 0.08 0.01 63/68 0.01 -0.13 
4 2 : i 9 ( 1 . 7 6 ) * * ( 1 1 7 9 ) * * 3 3 : 2 7 ( 2 , 1 0 ) * * ( 1 1 3 9 ) * * 2 9 : 3 4 ( O . M ) 1990) 
T-3 60/69 1.89 2.44 60/68 0.04 0.04 63/69 -0.04 -0.17 
4 1 : 1 9 ( 2 . 1 6 ) * * ( 1 2 0 4 ) * * 3 4 : 2 6 ( 1 . 5 7 ) * ( 1 0 6 5 ) 25 :3B i-O.S. l) ( S 6 8 ) 
T-2 60/69 1.44 1.08 62/69 0.04 0.02 61/69 -0.11 -0.18 
33:25 (1.94) ** (1137) * 33:29 (131) * (1116) 26:35 (-1.73) ** {690) ** 
T-1 64/68 1.05 -0.14 65/69 0.09 0.09 64/69 0.02 -0.11 
3 0 : 3 4 0 . 7 ? ) * * ( 1 2 1 7 ) 4 1 : 2 4 ( 2 . 7 2 ) * * * ( 1 4 1 7 ) * * 2B :36 ( 0 . 3 2 ) ( 1 0 1 5 ) 
T 63/68 -0.02 0.07 61/68 0.02 0.01 63/68 0.11 0.02 
？2:31 (-().03) (1084) 33:28 (0.69) (1024) 33:30 (1.58) * (1133) 
T+1 54/59 0.10 -0.22 56/60 -0.02 -0.01 54/60 0.14 0.07 
2 5 : 2 9 ( 0 . 1 3 ) ( 7 6 5 ) 2 7 : 2 9 (-0 .51 ) ( 7 4 3 ) 31 :23 ( 1 . 8 6 ) * * ( 9 0 8 j * 
T+2 45/50 0.45 0.26 46/50 0.00 0.00 45/50 0.20 0.08 
2 3 : 2 2 ( 0 . 5 4 ) ( 5 5 2 ) 2 3 : 2 3 ⑴ . 0 6 ) ( 5 3 6 ) 30 :15 ( 2 , 6 3 ) * * * ( 7 2 5 ) * * * 
T+3 33/36 -0.17 -0.26 33/36 0.05 0.07 33/36 0.15 0.10 
16:17 (-0 . 17 ) ( 2 6 7 ) 18 :15 {0 , 81 ) ( 3 0 8 ) 22 :11 ( 1 , 9 3 ) * * ( 3 7 6 ) * * 
T+4 20/22 -2.56 0.12 19/21 -0.04 -0.04 20/22 0.28 0.19 
10:10 (-1.04) (90) 8:1 1 (-0.6?.) (80) 14:6 {2.15) ** (156) ** 
T+5 9/9 -0.02 -1.68 8/9 -0.08 0.00 9/9 0.76 0.28 
3:6 {-0.02) (19) 4:4 (-0,70) (16) 6:3 (1.63) * (34) 
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Table 12. Statistics of change in industry adjusted dividend ratios 
The sample consists of 69 companies successfully conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except 
subsidiary disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive ratio v.s. the number of effective events with negative ratio. In the column of "Mean" figures 
in black are mean value of the sample and figures in bracket is the t-statistics in student t test. In the 
column of "Median", figures in black are median value of the sample and the figures in bracket is the 
Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
Net margin Asset turnover Asset/Equity 
Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
T s 47/53 T T 9 T 3 0 36/40 ^ ^ ^ ^ 48/53 ^ 0 J 8 
18:29 ( - 1 . 5 2 ) * ( 4 5 1 ) 17:19 (-0.93) {278} 36 :12 (3 .24 ) * * * (.889) * * * 
T-4 57/65 -0.54 0.59 48/53 0.04 0.03 56/65 0.00 -0.01 
3 1 : 2 6 (••0.99) ( 7 3 2 ) 31 :17 ( 2 . 03 ) * * ( 7 55 ) * * 26 :30 (0 ,01) ( 795 ) 
T-3 62/68 -1.14 -0.87 56/65 -0.03 -0.04 57/68 -0.02 -0.01 
27 :35 (-1 .78 ) * * (,743) * 21 :35 ( -1.88) * * ( 5 56 ) * * 28 :29 (••0,45) ( 797 ) 
T-2 57/69 -0.48 -0.11 59/68 -0.03 -0.02 59/69 -0.03 -0.03 
26:31 (-1 .00 ) ( 725} 26 :33 (-2 ,03) * * ( 6 49 ) * * 2S:31 ( . 0 . 60 ) (807 ) 
T-1 59/68 -0.72 0.40 61/69 0.02 0.01 62/69 0.12 0.13 
3 3 : 2 6 (-1 .34 ) * ( 8 6 8 ) 33 :28 ( 0 . 87 ) ( 1 0 4 2 ) 38 :24 (2 .35) * * f ! 3 0 1 ) * * 
T 62/67 0.19 0.30 60/68 -0.02 -0.02 63/68 0.10 0.07 
34 : 28 ( 0 . 3 0 ) n o 14) 25 :35 (-1 .55) * ( 7 3 7 ) * 40 :23 {2.94) * * * ( 1428 ) * * * 
T+1 54/59 -1.11 0.23 53/60 -0.03 -0.01 55/60 0.05 0.05 
29:25 (-1.32) * (.737) 24:29 (..2.3-1、）** (544) * 32:23 (1.74) ** (951) * 
T+2 43/49 -0.89 0.30 46/50 -0.01 -0.00 44/50 0.07 0.09 
24 : 19 (-1 .31 ) * ( 4 5 0 ) 2 2 : 2 4 (,0.、3S) ( 5 0 7 ) 27 :17 (1 .68) * {6\5) * 
T+3 33/36 0.30 0.18 36/36 0.02 0.01 30/36 0.05 0.05 
1 9 : i 4 (0 .37； ( 3 1 5 ) ( l . O O ) 0 9 5 } 19:11 (1 .41 ) * ( 2 9 9 ) * 
T+4 18/22 -1.22 -0.91 19/21 -0.03 -0.02 20/22 0.03 0.06 
6:12 (-1 .10 ) (61) (._0.9】） (72) 14:6 {0 .49) (127) 
T+5 9/9 5.31 4.36 8/9 0.05 0.00 8/9 -0.24 -0.06 
7:2 ( 1 . 3 9 ) ( 3 4 ) 5:3 ( 1 . 1 2 ) { 23 j 4:4 (-1.51)* ( 10 ) 
50 
Table 12. Statistics of change in industry adjusted dividend ratios 
The sample consists of 69 companies successfully conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except 
subsidiary disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive ratio v.s. the number of effective events with negative ratio. In the column of "Mean" figures 
in black are mean value of the sample and figures in bracket is the t-statistics in student t test. In the 
column of "Median", figures in black are median value of the sample and the figures in bracket is the 
Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
Payout ratio Dividend yield 
Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
51/57 ^ ^ 31/37 ^ 
20:10 (2.81) *** 0 6 2 ) 11:7 (1.35) * (113) 
T-4 55/60 7.32 0.00 40/43 0.25 0.00 
25:17 (1.58) * (554) 16:12 (2.28) ** (293) ** 
T-3 58/62 8.17 0.00 52/58 0.37 0.00 
26:20 (1,90) ** (715)** 23:15 (3.06)*** (535) *** 
T-2 60/65 3.23 0.00 61/67 0.25 0.00 
24:28 (0.86) (736) 28:24 (2.43) *** (858) * 
T-1 60/66 3.26 0.00 58/66 0.36 0.04 
25:26 (0.92) (725) 29:19 (3.25) *** (867) *** 
T 59/63 16.06 14.12 61/67 0.70 0.45 
36:16 (3.58) ***{H)23) *** 35:11 (5.22) *** (941) *** 
T+1 48/52 9.60 0.00 51/59 0.51 0.00 
21:14 (2.52) *** (445) ** 21:9 (3.72) *** (393) *** 
T+2 43/46 13.28 0.00 45/48 0.77 0.26 
21:14 (2 .79 ) *** ( 4 5 6 ) ** 23:6 ( 4 . 7 5 ) * * * ( 4 0 1 ) * * * 
T+3 30/34 3.97 0.00 32/35 0.40 0.15 
11:14 (0.81) (184) 16:7 (2.02) ** (202)** 
T+4 15/17 21.17 19.75 19/22 0.73 0.24 
10:2 (2.50) ** (67) ** 10:1 (3.56) *** (65) *** 
T+5 7/8 2.00 0.00 9/9 1.27 0.00 
2:1 (0.26) (4) 4:1 (2.00) ** (14) * 
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Table 12. Statistics of change in industry adjusted dividend ratios 
The sample consists of 69 companies successfully conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except 
subsidiary disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive ratio v.s. the number of effective events with negative ratio. In the column of "Mean" figures 
in black are mean value of the sample and figures in bracket is the t-statistics in student t test. In the 
column of "Median", figures in black are median value of the sample and the figures in bracket is the 
Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
Payout ratio Dividend yield 
Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
T ^ 39/44 U o ^ 25/29 ^ 
11:17 (-0.58) (173) 13:7 (2.14) ** (155)** 
T-4 49/54 -5.32 -0.72 31/36 0.03 0.00 
16:26 (-1.05) (369) 13:12 (0.26) (167) 
T-3 52/55 4.09 0.00 36/43 -0.12 0.00 
23:24 (0.85) (628) 17:14 (-0.92) (218) 
T-2 52/61 -8.81 -3.06 52/58 -0.15 -0.01 
21:29 (-2.28) (449)** 23:26 (-1.31) * (538) 
T-1 56/63 -0.36 3.69 58/65 0.14 0.09 
29:24 (-0.08) (718) 30:24 (1.01) (879) 
T 56/61 9.73 8.00 54/65 0.26 0.21 
36:16 (2.72) (992) • • • 30:IS (2.52)*** (815)** 
T+1 47/50 -7.38 0.00 51/58 -0.10 0.00 
19:23 (-1.81) ** (335) * 22:21 (-1.01) (406) 
丁+2 36/40 5.92 13.31 43/47 0.20 0.00 
24:11 (1.44) * (402)* 20:15 (1.33) * (400) * 
T+3 29/33 3.50 0.00 31/34 -0.00 0.00 
14:12 (0.78) (202) 15:11 (-0.00) (180) 
T+4 15/17 2.03 6.54 18/22 -0.19 0.00 
8:5 (0.24) (50) 5:8 1-1.25) (29) 
T+5 5/5 7.71 0.00 7/9 -0.07 0.00 
3:2 (0.87) (10) 3:1 (-0.3 i) (6) 
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Table 13. Statistics of industry adjusted stockholding returns, top and bottom line growth 
The sample consists of 69 companies successfully conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except 
subsidiary disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive ratio v.s. the number of effective events with negative ratio. In the column of "Mean" figures 
in black are mean value of the sample and figures in bracket is the t-statistics in student t test. In the 
column of "Median", figures in black are median value of the sample and the figures in bracket is the 
Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
Total holding return Net profit growth Revenue growth 
Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
T^ 2™ ^42 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
15:12. (-0.57) (168) 26:21 (1.丨8) (674) 29; 18 (2.53) *** (748) ** 
T-4 36/38 5.97 0.32 55/61 9.45 7.18 62/65 15.68 9.13 
18:18 ( 1 . 1 9 ) { 380 ) 3 2 : 2 3 ( 1 . 7 5 ) * * ( 9 7 9 ) * * 41 :21 ( 3 . 6 1 ) * * * ( 1 4 2 8 ) * » * 
T-3 41/45 3.65 -2.41 58/64 10.34 8.21 64/68 7.28 5.70 
i 7 : 24 ( 0 . 8 9 ) ( 4 4 0 ) 37 :21 ( 1 . 6 8 ) * * ( 1 1 2 7 ) * * 3S:2() ( 2 . 5 8 ) * * * ( 1 3 7 1 ) * * 
T-2 54/57 -0.05 -2.20 57/63 8.48 7.42 64/69 7.44 0.66 
2 6 : 2 8 (-0 .01 ) ( 7 2 3 ) 35:22 ( 1 - 6 8 ) * * ( 1 0 1 2 ) * 33:31 ( 2 . 0 0 ) * * ( 1 2 5 5 ) * 
T-1 58/64 5.89 2.29 59/64 10.69 4.88 62/68 11.65 9.12 
33 : 25 ( 2 . 5 4 ) * * * ( ! 126) * * .、)():?」 ( 1 . 8 3 ) * * ( 1 1 1 9 ) * * 38 :24 ( 2 . 8 1 ) * * * ( 1 3 1 9 ) * * * 
T 59/65 1.60 -0.60 61/65 -10.43 1.23 59/67 9.43 9.91 
2 9 : 3 0 ( 0 . 5 2 ) ( 8 7 7 ) 3 1 : 3 0 (-0 .39 ) ( 9 5 2 ) 4 4 : 1 5 ( 3 J 8 ) * * * ( 1 3 1 2 ) * * * 
T+1 53/58 4.15 1.75 52/56 9.96 6.61 53/59 5.12 3.86 
2 8 : 2 5 ( 1 . 4 9 ) * ( 8 4 1 ) 30:22 ( i . l 8 ) ( 8 1 7 ) 34 :19 ( i . 8 6 ) * * ( 9 2 0 ) * * 
T+2 44/48 5.36 -1.09 39/43 14.29 1.81 45/49 1.04 0.11 
2 1 : 2 3 ( 1 . 4 8 ) * ( 5 7 8 ) 2 0 : 1 9 0 . 3 5 ) * (4 I :< ) 2 3 : 2 2 ( 0 . 2 8 ) ( 5 1 6 ) 
T+3 26/29 4.57 4.37 31/35 -17.44 -5.15 33/36 2.05 -0.12 
15:11 ( 0 . 9 6 ) ( 2 0 8 ) 10:21 (-1 .23 ) ( 1 4 5 ) * * 16 :17 ( 0 . 5 9 ) ( 3 0 5 ) 
T+4 18/20 -5.87 -6.53 18/21 34.94 6.05 20/22 -5.60 -7.92 
5 : 1 ? (-0 .92 ) ( 6 3 ) 9 : 9 ( 0 . 4 8 ) (1 13) 9:11 (-1 .05 ) ( 8 0 ) 
T+5 8/9 -3.30 1.09 6/6 5.11 9.01 7/9 -5.17 -6.03 
4 : 4 (-0 ,58 ) n ( ) ) , v l ( 0 . 4 3 ) (15) 1:6 (-0 .88 ) (7) 
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Table 14. Statistics of change in industry adjusted stockholding returns, top and bottom line growth 
The sample consists of 69 companies successfully conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except 
subsidiary disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive ratio v.s. the number of effective events with negative ratio. In the column of "Mean" figures 
in black are mean value of the sample and figures in bracket is the t-statistics in student t test. In the 
column of "Median", figures in black are median value of the sample and the figures in bracket is the 
Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
Total holding return Net profit growth Revenue growth 
Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
T ^ 16/18 T i ? \5A5 36/38 -42.30 -13.60 3 5 / 4 0 U s 4^65 
10:6 (-0.08) (19) 15:21 (-0.61) (226)** 18:17 (-0.49) (317) 
T-4 24/29 9.08 7.61 41/47 5.10 5.43 49/53 2.33 4.93 
15:9 ( 1 . 3 6 ) * ( 1 9 7 ) * 2 4 : 1 7 ( 0 . 6 7 ) ( 4 9 2 ) 26 : 23 ( 0 . 3 4 ) ( 6 6 0 ) 
T-3 32/38 1.22 8.99 54/59 -11.62 -10.13 59/65 -12.11 -5.30 
19:13 ( 0 . 2 6 ) ( 2 9 1 ) 2 2 : 3 2 (-1 .30 ) * ( 5 2 5 ) * * 2 4 : 35 (-2 .27 ) * * ( 6 7 6 ) * 
T-2 39/44 -8.07 -12.59 53/59 -3.92 -1.23 63/68 0.31 1.84 
！ 5:24 (-1.27) (295} * 26:27 (••0.54) (645) .>3:?0 (0.07) (998) 
T-1 53/57 5.08 10.20 55/61 -5.86 -2.82 61/68 9.65 6.61 
2 9 : 2 4 fO .98 ) ( S i m 2 6 : 2 9 (-0 .72 ) ( 6 9 8 ) 3 4 : 2 7 ( L 8 2 ) * * ( 1 1 6 7 ) * 
T 54/62 -3.50 -2.00 57/61 -35.60 -22.82 62/67 -6.38 -5.31 
2 4 : 3 0 (-0 .99 ) ( 6 2 0 ) 22 : 35 (-1 .50 ) * ( 5 7 5 ) * * 30 :32 (-1 .30 ) * ( 8 4 5 ) 
T+1 50/57 4.60 8.10 50/54 -10.11 5.15 53/58 -3.64 -5.77 
3 2 : 1 8 ( 1 . 3 7 ) * ( 7 7 6 ) * 2 7 : 2 3 (••0.64) (6{J3) 2 0 : ? 3 (-1 .00 ) ( 5 8 6 ) 
T+2 44/48 -3.34 -4.90 38/41 4.35 -4.05 41/49 -1.04 -0.68 
19:25 r-0 .73) ( 4 1 9 、 18:20 ( 0 . 3 0 ) ( 3 6 4 ) 19:22 (-0 .30 ) ( 3 8 7 ) 
T+3 25/29 3.26 5.88 24/30 -24.01 -21.62 31/36 -5.56 -3.24 
15:10 ( 0 . 4 9 ) ( 1 8 7 ) 6 : 18 (-1 .95 ) * * ( 8 1 ) * * ！ 5 ; 16 (-1 ,37 ) * ( ! S 2 ) 
T+4 17/19 -11.02 -6.23 18/21 -4.42 10.16 19/22 -7.76 -10.71 
6:11 (-1 .58 ) * ( 5 0 ) 11:7 (-0 .05 ) f 101) 7 : 12 {-1 .14) ( 6 6 ) 
T+5 8/9 -10.61 -9.76 5/6 3.44 10.93 8/9 -10.97 -16.55 
3:5 (-1 .19 ) ( 1 0 ) 4:1 ( 0 . 1 7 ) ( i O ) 3 :5 (••0.87) ( 1 1 ) 
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Table 15. Statistics of industry adjusted growth rate of net asset value (ADJNAVG) 
The sample consists of 77 companies conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except subsidiary 
disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive ADJNAVG v.s. the number of effective events with negative ADJNAVG. In the column of 
"Mean" figures in black are average ADJNAVG (%) of the sample and figures in bracket is the 
t-statistics in student t test. In the column of "Median", figures in black are median ADJNAVG (%) of 
the sample and the figures in bracket is the Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
Year All Net asset pricing Net asset pricing of listing companj 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
28/34 ^ O 2 16/20 5719 ^ ^ O ^ 
14:10 (-0.57) (154) 8:5 (0.21) (58) 2:2 (0.29) (5) 
T-4 37/43 5.28 1.19 18/22 -1.85 0.00 8/8 11.09 1.18 
20:13 (1.73) ** (343) 7:7 (-0.94) (44) 4:1 (1.771 * (13)* 
T-3 41/50 3.12 0.71 19/24 1.52 0.50 7/8 2.69 0.67 
2 7 : 1 2 f l . 8 5 ) * * ( 5 1 8 ) * * l i : 6 ( 0 . 8 7 ) ( 9 2 ) 4 : 2 ( 0 . 6 1 ) ( J 3 ) 
T-2 53/65 2.37 0.94 27/32 2.83 1.45 9/10 6.05 7.51 
31:20 (2.17)** (834) * 17:8 (1.95) (227)** 6:2 (2.54) ** (33) ** 
T-1 65/72 1.66 0.00 32/36 1.61 0.00 11/12 -0.81 -1.14 
31 :31 ( 1 . 8 0 ) * * ( 1 1 3 S ) 15 :15 ( 1 . 2 5 ) ( 2 7 7 ) 4 : 6 (-0 .45 ) ( 2 2 ) 
T 63/74 3.42 1.56 32/38 2.18 0.00 10/12 5.17 1.28 
38:23 (2.54) ** (1296) *** 15:15 (1.40) * (275) 6:3 (1.64) * (35) * 
T+1 53/65 0.56 0.00 28/33 0.08 -0.17 10/11 0.62 0.06 
2 6 : 2 4 ( 0 . 6 4 ) ( 6 9 S ) 12 :15 ( 0 . 0 6 ) ( 1 7 6 ) 5:5 ( 0 . 3 7 ) ( 3 1 ) 
T+2 45/55 0.89 2.60 25/30 2.16 2.60 9/11 4.26 4.60 
28:15 (0.69) (609) * 16:8 (1,51) * (206) * 7:2 (2.66) ** (40)** 
T+3 33/40 1.82 0.26 21/23 1.60 1.49 9/9 -6.82 0.26 
18:13 (0.92) (306) 13:7 (0.23) (134) 5:3 (-0.48) (18) 
T+4 20/25 1.27 2.86 13/13 -17.78 1.36 6/6 -17.11 -1.06 
13:7 (0.43) (136) 7:6 (-1.25) (40) 3:3 {-0.65) (8) 
T+5 10/12 5.59 0.37 5/5 -1.96 -0.78 2/2 -1.11 -1.11 
5:5 (1.21) (37) 1:4 (-0.86) (4) 0:2 (-3.02) ⑴） 
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Table 16. Statistics of change in industry adjusted growth of net asset value (DADJNAVG) 
The sample consists of 77 companies conducted MBO, including all types of MBO except subsidiary 
disposal. The event year T is set to be the completion year of MBO. 
In the column of "Number", the figures in black represent the effective (after removing the abnormal 
observations) sample size out of all and figures in grey imply the number of effective events with 
positive DADJNAVG v.s. the number of effective events with negative DADJNAVG. In the column of 
"Mean" figures in black are average DADJNAVG (%) of the sample and figures in bracket is the 
t-statistics in student t test. In the column of "Median", figures in black are median DADJNAVG (%) of 
the sample and the figures in bracket is the Wilcoxon Z statistic in Wilcoxon test. 
Year All Net asset pricing vJet asset pricing of listing compan: 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
T ^ 19/24 Z(y7 T I s m ^ ^ ^ Tn> ^ 
7:10 (-1.69) * (44 ) * 4 :6 (-1.-11) * (15 ) 1:1 (••0.90) ( 1 ) 
T-4 31/34 1.36 0.80 19/20 -3.39 0.00 6/6 10.16 13.17 
17:12 (0 .30 ) ( 234 ) 9 ;8 f-0.59} (66 ) 4:1 {0.79} (11 ) 
T-3 42/43 -4.40 0.00 21/22 10.48 1.79 6/8 -3.20 -3.67 
20 :20 (-0.79) ( 366 ) 12:7 (1 .57 ) * ( 127 ) 2:3 (-1.09) (3 ) 
T-2 46/50 -1.48 0.00 21/24 -6.49 0.00 7/8 -1.67 5.32 
22 :22 1-0.39) ( 461 ) 10:9 (••1.18^ (74 ) 4 :2 ( . 0 . 23 ) (10 ) 
T-1 57/65 -5.07 -2.08 28/32 -0.86 -2.56 8/10 -7.64 -5.31 
22 :35 (.-2.04) * * ( 580 ) * * 10:18 ^-0.24) (155 ) 1:7 (-2.77) * * (2) ** 
T 60/70 2.62 1.21 29/34 0.54 0.65 10/12 4.21 1.45 
3 8 : 2 2 ( 1 . 2 7 ) ( 1 1 1 8 ) * 1 8 : 1 1 ( 0 . 1 5 ) ( 2 5 3 ) 8 : 2 ( l . U 2 ) ( 4 2 ) * 
T+1 54/64 -1.04 -0.52 26/33 -1.87 -0.48 9/11 0.69 0.09 
23:31 (-0.70) ( 603 ) 11:15 f-1.58) * ( 141 ) 5:4 (0 .83 ) {26 ! 
T+2 49/55 -1.71 0.09 26/30 1.14 0.56 11/11 5.62 0.80 
25 :23 (...0.94) (516.) 16-JO (0.5 i ) i ! 9 6 ) 8:3 (1 .61 ) * (49 ) * 
T+3 34/40 -2.18 -1.60 20/23 -8.90 0.50 7/9 2.13 3.50 
13:20 (-0.70) (252) 10:10 (-1.35} * (95) -1:3 (0.45) (U>) 
T+4 22/25 -6.25 1.28 12/13 -13.55 1.35 6/6 -29.86 -19.72 
1 2 : 1 0 ( - i . 2 4 ) ( 1 2 1 ) 7 : 5 ( - 1 . 0 6 ) ( 3 5 ) 3 : 3 ( - 0 . 9 4 ) ( 7 ) 
T+5 10/12 16.06 7.81 5/5 16.07 -2.84 2/2 -0.05 -0.05 
7:3 (2.12) ** (44) * 2:3 (0.79) (6) 1:1 ( -O.OZ) (1) 
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Table 17. Comparison of MBO between US and China 
U S China 
Acquired shares — Transferable shares J^on-tradable shares 
Share pricing Stock price in secondary market Net asset value 
- — — 
Financing of M B O Bond, loan and private equity Sel f -owned money 
— 
Competition Much Little 
— Wealth g ^ n s Positive Negative 
Operating performance improvement Yes N o 
— 
Price manipulation Yes 
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Chart 1. Industry adjusted measures 
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